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As global attention focuses on the financial crisis and 
Arabrevolutions, fragility appears to be slipping down 
Europe’s agenda. Important processes aimed at ad-
dressing fragility have stalled, with the European Ex-
ternal Action Service (EEAS) shelving the Action Plan 
on Fragility and Conflict (Action Plan) and the review 
of the Gothenburg Programme on conflict prevention 
(Gothenburg Review). However, recent events from So-
malia to Pakistan demonstrate that addressing fragility 
remains critical. Indeed, it is possible that through bet-
ter preventative action on fragile states the European 
Union (EU) could have avoided some of the acute chal-
lenges it now faces in Libya and Syria. While High Rep-
resentative Ashton has stressed that conflict is a policy 
priority, in practice the EU needs a stronger and broad-
er approach to fragility in order to meet its security and 
development aims. 
The EU has a comprehensive policy framework on fra-
gility and conflict. However, the gap between policy 
and practice means this framework has little impact on 
the ground. The Action Plan and Gothenburg Review 
could have addressed this weakness, as they were in-
tended to develop practical guidance for policy imple-
mentation. Instead, June 2011’s Council Conclusions on
Conflict Prevention provided yet another general state-
ment of commitment to addressing conflict.
There has been no formal explanation of why the Ac-
tion Plan and Gothenburg Review have been blocked. 
Some EEAS staff suggest that the leadership does not 
appreciate the value of practical guidance for policy im-
plementation. This implies a failure to understand that 
the multiple European actors in fragile contexts have 
different agendas and practices and therefore require 
clear guidance in order to jointly implement European 
policy. Such a need is clearly illustrated by the EU’s un-
prepared and disorganised response to the recent cri-
sis in Ivory Coast. Moreover, leading member states are 
frustrated with Brussels’ response to fragility. A recent 
UK Department for International Development paper 
stressed that the EU must provide a ‘stronger, more co-
herent effort in fragile and post-conflict countries’. 
While the EU transition process and shifting leader-
ship priorities may have blocked some opportunities 
to strengthen Europe’s response to fragility, others lie 
ahead. The development of the next set of Country 
Strategy Papers (CSPs) provides an opportunity to main-
stream fragility into country level strategies. However, 
given that the recently published regional strategies for 
the Horn of Africa and Sahel do not include the latest 
thinking on fragility, it seems that such mainstreaming 
is not happening. The Evaluation of European Commis-
sion Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, 
due in autumn 2011, could provide an important evi-
dence base for the development of CSPs. In addition, 
the fragility unit within the EU’s new Directorate Gen-
eral for Development and Cooperation – once it is fully 
staffed – has the potential to feed the latest knowledge 
on fragility into EU policy and action. 
In order to take full advantage of these opportunities 
EU policy makers must examine why Europe contin-
ues to punch below its weight in fragile contexts. It is 
widely recognised that this is partly because of prob-
lems with ‘how’ the EU works; its processes, instruments 
and programmes. This is what the Action Plan primarily 
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intended to address. However, Europe’s lack of impact 
is also due to its limited understanding of fragility and 
lack of political vision regarding ‘what’ the EU should fo-
cus on in fragile contexts. 
“How” the EU works in 
fragile contexts
The Action Plan and Gothenburg Review could have 
provided practical guidance to address the political, 
institutional and financial challenges to implementing 
European policies on fragility. These include problems 
related to policy coherence, coordination, effectiveness 
and partnerships. 
The EU is far from achieving a ‘whole of Europe’ ap-
proach in fragile contexts and this limits the impact 
of its policy framework. European policy coherence is 
often weaker in fragile contexts, as powerful member 
states pursue individual interests in these high stakes 
environments. Moreover, as a wide range of EU policy 
areas (including security, development, foreign policy, 
trade, agriculture, fisheries, energy and migration) can 
affect fragility, incoherence between these areas is par-
ticularly damaging. A stark example of such policy inco-
herence was member states’ continued export of arms 
to Sri Lanka while Brussels was demanding a ceasefire. 
A more subtle example is the EU’s attempts to push 
Guinea Bissau into a fishing agreement that will provide 
little government income, despite the fact that dwin-
dling national revenue is fuelling the country’s fragility. 
The EEAS could provide greater leadership for policy 
coherence. However, the fact that it does not lead on 
all policy areas relevant to fragility makes this task dif-
ficult. It should therefore prioritise coordinating policies 
among key actors in relation to the specific policy areas 
that have the greatest potential to affect fragility in a 
given context. 
Coordination of activities among European actors is 
crucial in fragile states, where aid is disbursed rapidly 
and local governments may lack the capacity to lead 
coordination. However, in reality EU coordination is 
usually limited to information sharing, with each insti-
tution setting its own objectives and subsequently in-
forming others of these. This is unsurprising given the 
varying political agendas, goals, models of operation 
and timeframes of the many civil and military Europe-
an actors involved. In this regard, the Action Plan and 
Gothenburg Review could have been useful in guiding 
coordinated action. 
The EEAS is uniquely positioned to facilitate a move 
from ‘information sharing’ to genuine coordination. Its 
special representatives could bring together EU and 
member state staff at country level to develop shared 
problem analyses and strategies. Likewise senior EEAS 
staff could play an important role in highlighting obsta-
cles to coordination. It is important that staff are given 
incentives to coordinate, and that lessons are learned 
from successful examples of collaboration. 
The effectiveness of European aid instruments in fragile 
contexts is an important issue that would have been 
addressed by the Action Plan and Gothenburg Review. 
The EU’s main aid instruments are slow, inflexible and 
often inappropriate for fragile contexts. This has re-
sulted in overreliance on the Instrument for Stability. 
As it rethinks its aid instruments, the EU could benefit 
from the 2011 World Development Report’s lessons re-
garding a ‘best fit’ approach. The report suggests that 
international assistance must be flexible enough that 
budgeting, staffing and results measurement can be 
adapted to the local fragile context. Critically, ‘best fit’ 
requires empowered leadership at country level, which 
is lacking in EU responses. For example, micromanage-
ment of ESDP missions by Brussels prevents staff on 
the ground from reshaping programmes to meet local 
needs. 
The Action Plan and Gothenburg Review would also 
have addressed issues of ownership and partnership. 
These are particularly problematic in fragile contexts, 
where governments can be weak or uncooperative 
and civil society has little capacity. The EU tends to work 
with a limited range of partners, both because it is risk 
averse and because low capacity organisations cannot 
fulfil the EU’s bureaucratic requirements. However, in or-
der to better understand and respond to local dynam-
ics of fragility, EU actors must extend and deepen their 
partnerships. For example, in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo the EU delegation held provincial level work-
shops to reach out to local civil society organisations. 
The EU should take risks with non-traditional partners 
that may not speak ‘donor language’ or fully share its 
agenda, and move from technocratic engagement to a 
more political dialogue with partners. 
Understanding 
the politics of fragility
The main emphasis of the 2007 ‘Council Conclusions 
on an EU response to situations of fragility’ and result-
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ing Action Plan is on improving European practice and 
programming in fragile contexts. However, in order to 
be relevant, such improvements must be informed by a 
comprehensive political vision of the nature of fragility, 
as well as a strong understanding of the drivers of fragil-
ity in specific local contexts.
The current EU policy framework offers a limited under-
standing of fragility as a failure of governance. Fragility 
is defined in the 2007 Council Conclusions as ‘weak or 
failing structures and situations where the social con-
tract is broken due to the State’s incapacity or unwilling-
ness to deal with its basic functions’. This definition fails 
to recognise the complex social and economic factors 
that can drive fragility, such as ethnic relations, a weak 
economic base or social exclusion. Nor does it acknowl-
edge the role of non-state actors. In this regard, the EU 
could learn from the fragility work of leading bilateral 
European donors such as the UK and Netherlands. 
In line with other international actors, the EU defines its 
response to fragility as support for state building. How-
ever – unsurprisingly, given its state-focused defini-
tion of fragility – EU support to state building is largely 
limited to technocratic reform of public institutions. It 
generally does not address broader issues of state–so-
ciety relations or social cohesion. Nor does it take full 
account of the complex political agendas of national 
and international actors. For example in Guinea Bissau 
the EU treats the political elite and military as if they 
are distinct groups, not recognising that the historic 
connection between them prevents civilian authorities 
from undertaking comprehensive military reform.
The World Bank, OECD and leading bilateral donors in-
creasingly stress that international responses to fragility 
should be based on indepth political economy analy-
sis and focused on political dialogue. This emphasis 
has been adopted by the EU and is mentioned in the 
2007 Council Conclusions. It seems that the capacity of 
EU delegations to undertake political economy analy-
sis and engage politically is improving. However, this 
analysis is mostly restricted to a ‘state focused’ agenda 
and does not address more complex societal drivers of 
fragility.
Disappointingly, the EU’s improved political economy 
analysis does not appear to have much influence on 
programming. For example, the 2008–2013 CSPs for Si-
erra Leone and Guinea Bissau contain strong analysis 
and identify diverse drivers of fragility including state 
capture, patronage relations, weak economic base and 
ethnic divisions. Despite this recognition of the complex 
causes of fragility, EU programming in these countries 
has followed a standardised blueprint of public sector 
reform, decentralisation, public financial management 
and electoral reform.
Of course, addressing underlying structural factors that 
drive fragility is more difficult than supporting ‘blue-
print’ reform of state institutions. It is more sensitive, 
involves greater risks and provides less measurable re-
sults. It requires mechanisms in headquarters to absorb 
new thinking on fragility, as well as experts in the field 
who can combine theoretical knowledge with an un-
derstanding of the local context. For example, the EU’s 
response in Ivory Coast has been hampered by lack of 
expertise on fragility. 
One important obstacle that prevents the EU from 
adopting the latest thinking on fragility is the fact that 
state building activities are spread across a number of 
EU institutions, and are not always recognised as such 
by those involved. For example, member states often 
do not understand the state building aspect of ESDP 
rule of law missions. While the EEAS could lead in pro-
moting a ‘state of the art’ state building agenda across 
the EU, the thematic side of the EEAS that deals with 
fragility is currently very weak.
’What’ the EU 
should do in fragile states
Above all, Europe needs a political vision of its unique 
role in addressing fragility. For the EU to fulfil its poten-
tial in fragile contexts, it must set priorities for engage-
ment that are based on its comparative advantages and 
go beyond crisis response or blueprint institution build-
ing. These priorities should build on Europe’s strengths, 
including its power as a political and trading bloc, its 
own experiences of political transition and regional in-
tegration and its long term presence and relatively sta-
ble financial commitments in fragile contexts.
An obvious comparative advantage for the EU is to 
support regional integration as a response to fragility. 
Regional integration can build resilience by promot-
ing good governance, fostering economic growth and 
addressing common security challenges. However, as 
seen in West Africa, results can be disappointing if gov-
ernments are unwilling to devolve real power. The EU 
has a good record of support to African regional inte-
gration. It has built partnerships with African regional 
bodies and is a major funder of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture. The EU could help to build the ca-
pacity of regional bodies, such as ECOWAS, to address 
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the root causes of fragility rather than just respond to 
crises. It should also support emerging forms of re-
gional security cooperation that straddle established 
regional groupings, such as between Mali, Niger, Mau-
ritania and Algeria. 
The EU needs to adopt a more political approach to re-
gional integration and fragility in Africa. Although the 
EU-Africa Strategy does not specifically mention fra-
gility, its references to governance, human rights and 
conflict provide openings for greater political dialogue 
on fragility. Dialogue around the EUAfrica strategy has 
so far been overly focused on operational issues and 
needs to address more sensitive political topics. The EU 
should also encourage regional powers, such as Nige-
ria, to show greater leadership in addressing fragility in 
their neighbourhood. 
Another area where the EU could have a comparative 
advantage is addressing the societal causes of fragility, 
including lack of social cohesion, inequality and margin-
alisation. Europe has a good record of building strong 
and inclusive social contracts and important lessons to 
share in this regard. Moreover, its long term engage-
ment in fragile contexts allows it to dedicate the time 
and resources required to work on these deep rooted, 
structural drivers of fragility. This would require the EU 
to improve the quality of its analysis and take risks with 
new partners and ways of working. For example, in Ne-
pal some European bilateral donors have taken innova-
tive steps to address exclusion as a driver of fragility. 
The EU’s long term presence also makes it well placed to 
take on board recent thinking about ‘working with the 
grain’ in African fragile states. In particular, it could invest 
in building relationships with local institutions, support 
locally legitimate mechanisms for decision making and 
problem solving, and identify and strengthen local 
sources of resilience. A particularly important agenda 
for the EU would be to foster the emergence of effec-
tive local leaders that have a developmental vision. 
As the main trading partner for many fragile states, EU 
trade policy has significant potential to reduce fragil-
ity. Although the need for WTO compliance prevents 
Europe from radically revising its trade policies, experts 
suggest that it could be more responsive to fragile con-
texts. In particular, the EU should examine how – within 
the WTO rules – its trade policy can best build resil-
ience, mitigate vulnerability to shocks, increase govern-
ment revenue and support regional integration. These 
considerations have been partially included in recent 
Economic Partnership Agreement renegotiations. 
The EU is well positioned to support human capital de-
velopment as a source of resilience. This could involve 
not only support to education, but also leveraging EU 
migration policy to allow students and professionals 
from fragile countries to gain valuable skills in Europe. 
In addition, Europe’s aid and trade policies should fo-
cus on generating labour intensive growth in order to 
address unemployment as a driver of fragility. For ex-
ample, donors urgently need to address the security 
threat posed by mass unemployment of rural youth in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The EU could also benefit from a broader approach to 
security. It is often overly focused on military and police 
reform and fails to address the range of other formal 
and informal institutions that can provide security. In 
this regard, the EU could learn from the more holistic 
approach of ‘citizen security’ outlined in the 2011 World 
Development Report. Afghanistan provides a clear ex-
ample of how prioritising strategic security goals over 
human security needs can undermine long term sta-
bility. On the other hand, in Sierra Leone ‘hard’ security 
sector reform has been accompanied by programmes 
to strengthen the rule of law and reform community 
level justice and security mechanisms. 
Colnclusion
Europe needs to get up to speed on fragility. With EU 
involvement in Afghanistan ending and the numbers 
of conflicts worldwide falling, EU policy makers may see 
fragility and conflict as less urgent priorities. But such an 
approach is not sustainable, as recent events in Libya 
confirm.
Bridging the gap between policy and imple - menta-
tion is a major priority for improving the European re-
sponse to fragility. This requires plans to guide action, 
but more importantly it requires leadership that priori-
tises coordination, effectiveness and partnership.
However, the EU also needs to develop a clearer politi-
cal vision of what constitutes fragility and what Europe’s 
unique role should be in responding to it. This involves 
engaging with the latest research, moving away from 
blueprint responses, strengthening context analysis, 
deepening and extending partnerships and broaden-
ing the scope of its work in areas of comparative advan-
tage. Perhaps most difficult, it involves confronting the 
political obstacles that prevent the EU from achieving 
its potential in fragile contexts.
